Towards Wireless Secret Key Agreement With Lora Physical Layer

Dodano: 13:43, 13.04.2021

Assuming an independent sub-carrier and a 1-bit quantification for each sub-carrier, the resulting key creation rate will be increased by a factor proportional to the size of the FFT, for example. B in the 64-6400 range, as far as RSSI diagrams are concerned. For example, given the distance of 15 KHz and the bandwidth of 100 MHz, at least 6666 sub-carrier/band bands are available for the filter bank. Description of the PLS box at the system level at the recipient`s page. The PLS box is independent of the baseband modem and provides a safety pathway for the key generator. Data decryption is done outdoors with AES-128, z.B. As shown in Table 2, pearson coefficients are calculated on Fb inputs to assess the correlation between Bob and Eve. The simulation consists of 6 different bandwidths and 2 different settings of the filter bank with filters M-32 and M-512. H. V. Poor, R. F.

Schaefer, Wireless physical layer security. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci.114 (1), 19-26 (2017). The interaction between our PLS box and the basic wireless modem is important in this regard. In fact, as shown [84], it is difficult to say whether a particular modem is trustworthy or not, because it is the only access point to the radio channel. That`s why we define 3 ideal configurations: Channel Exploration: while Alice and Bob exchange frames for communication, their PLS boxes work for security. If modem access to the PLS box is granted, the focus will be on the preamble to the received signal. Such a preamble contains sound sequences (z.B Zadoff-Chu) that are generally available for communication tasks (e.g.B.

channel estimation [99], media recovery and synchronization) and are therefore likely to study the radio channel for CRKG. Otherwise, without modem support, the PLS box can record the full frame received and process it for CRKG. During this phase of the protocol, Eve can carry out several attacks [100]. In [74], z.B a harassment attack is launched by Eve near Bob, which successfully reaches up to 97% of the CRKG key. In IoT scenarios, Eva can be represented by a variety of nodes (z.B. botnet) that can work passively together to connect the Alice Bob connection to multiple positions, even simultaneously at both ends. As part of the network, Eve is probably similar to Alice and Bob. In any case, it may also have more powerful hardware, which allows it to create intentional interference, namely jamming [40, 85]. The negative consequences of this attack could be unbalanced recipatoz in Alice and Bob signals, or a forced repetition of the CRKG scheme as a kind of denial of service. This can be harmful, as Eve might try to trigger several CRKG sessions and break the key.